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Abstract
By constructing a static model of a recyclable product market where the product
can be manufactured by using both a recycled material and a harvested natural
resource, we examine how di®erent types of economic policy instruments a®ect
resource harvesting activities of individual producers. In particular, we show that
an increase in a recycling subsidy for consumers and an increase in a waste disposal
fee on consumers can respectively lead to an increase in the resource harvest level.
We explore the conditions under which these economic instruments are likely to
back¯re in terms of natural resource conservation.
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1 Introduction
It is often argued that an important objective of recycling activities is to reduce the so-
ciety's demand for natural resources such as virgin timber and raw minerals (Kinnaman,
2006). As examples of economic instruments to facilitate recycling activities, environ-
mental economists have studied the functions of policy measures that range from direct
subsidies for recycling activities to more indirect policies such as taxes on the extractions
of natural resources and volume-based disposal fees in collecting solid household wastes.
Existing studies on these economic instruments have mainly focused on demonstrating
how a certain combination of policy instruments is able to attain the ¯rst-best, or the
second-best result by considering the social cost of depleting natural resources as well as
the costs of garbage disposal and land¯ll (e.g., Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995, Palmer and
Walls, 1997, and Shinkuma, 2003). Also, the empirical ¯ndings on the impacts of these
policy instruments are gradually becoming available. Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) and
Kinnaman (2006) provide summaries of early studies.
In this note, we construct a static model of a recyclable product market with a special
focus on the use of a natural resource as an input to its production and examine how a
variety of economic policy measures a®ect the amount of a natural resource harvested by
individual producers. The economic instruments we consider below are a volume-based
fee on household waste, a recycling subsidy for households, and a tax on natural resource
harvesting. Our main ¯nding is that an increase in recycling subsidy for consumers and an
increase in garbage disposal fee on consumers can respectively lead to an increase in the
amount of a natural resource harvested by producers. Hence, under certain circumstances,
these economic instruments can indeed accelerate the depletion of a natural resource
stock.1
In the next section, we describe the structure of our basic model. In section 3, we
conduct a comparative statics analysis of economic instruments and discuss how the
market equilibrium outcomes react to marginal changes in respective policy instruments.
The ¯nal section contains concluding remarks.
1In our model, however, we do not explicitly account for the dynamics of a natural resource stock,
which would be its important extension.
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2 The Model
Our static model of an economy with a recyclable product consists of L households and
N producers (L > 1 and N > 1). We assume that both households and producers behave
as price-takers. Let us start by describing a representative household's behavior.
2.1 The Behavior of a Household
A representative household consumes two kinds of consumer products, a recyclable prod-
uct, q, and, a numeraire, z. We suppose that the consumption of q units of the recyclable
product yields q units of waste to be disposed of by a household. Each household is ratio-
nal or far-sighted in the sense that, in determining how much of the goods it purchases,
it takes into account the eventual waste disposal cost following its consumption. In dis-
posing of its own waste, each household has two options. One is to use regular household
garbage disposal service, and the other is to resort to municipal collection service specif-
ically designed for subsequent recycling of household waste into a productive input.2 We
consider that the latter way of disposal causes some disutility to the household in sorting
and treating its waste properly, as well as inconvenience involved in its temporary storage
and the transportation of the waste to a proper collection site at a pre-speci¯ed date. The
household must pay a volume-based fee, ±, per unit of its waste intended for recycling,
rS, to the collector of the recyclable waste.
3 On the other hand, the household must pay
a ¯xed handling charge of ¿ per unit of garbage, g, for regular garbage disposal service.
Note that we always have g = q¡ rS. We assume throughout this paper that ± is strictly
smaller than ¿ .
Under these settings, a representative household's problem is to solve the following
constrained utility maximization problem with respect to the demand for the recyclable
product, qD, the supply of the recyclable waste, rS, and the consumption level of the
2Municipal collection service of general and recyclable garbages are quite prevalent in the real world
(Walls, Macauley and Anderson, 2005). We assume that neither a household nor a producer do not
incorporate the potential impacts of pro¯t or loss incurred by a waste collecting municipality into its
decision-making.
3We consider here that the actual collectors of the recyclable waste are municipal governments, which
can sell the waste to the producers afterwards and distribute the pro¯t in a lump-sum manner. Also,
note that a household does not receive any monetary payment from the producer as is typically assumed
in existing studies.
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numeraire z:
Max
qD;rS ;z
U = u(qD; rS) + z; (1)
s:t: pqD + z + ±rS + ¿g · w (2)
qD ¸ r; (3)
where p and w are the output price of the recyclable product and the household's total
income, respectively. In (1), u(qD; rS) is a part of the household's utility level that is
associated with the recyclable product. We suppose that it has the following properties:
uqD > 0; uqDqD < 0; urS < 0; urSrS < 0; and urSqD = 0.
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Assuming an interior solution, i.e., neither rS and g is zero with (3) holding with strict
inequality,5 the ¯rst-order conditions for the utility maximization problem are
uqD(qD; rS)¡ p¡ ¿ = 0; (4)
urS(qD; rS)¡ ± + ¿ = 0: (5)
These are fairly straight-forward marginal conditions. In particular, (5) implies that the
amount of the recyclable input supply is determined by a household in such a way that the
marginal disutility of treating its waste for the recycling purpose is equal to the di®erence
between the collection fees of regular waste and of the recyclable input.
2.2 The Behavior of a Producer
Now we turn to a representative ¯rm's behavior. A ¯rm's objective is to maximize its
pro¯t by selling the recyclable product, q. Each producer can process the recyclable
waste it obtains to create an input which can be used for producing the original output.6
The producer also uses a virgin input harvested from its own natural resource stock as
4The last property on the cross-partial term implies that the utility function is additively-separable,
which is a standard assumption in the literature when the cost of treating recyclable wastes is explicitly
incorporated.
5This is always the case when ± is strictly smaller than ¿ .
6Although quite unrealistic, we suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that the ¯rm can transform the
recyclable waste into the production input costlessly. The inclusion of such a cost will not alter any
qualitative results of this study.
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an input.7 The production function of the recyclable product is q(h; rD), where h is the
amount of the harvested natural resource and rD is the amount of the recyclable input
which the ¯rm obtains. We suppose that this production function has the following
properties: qh > 0; qhh < 0; qrD > 0; qrDrD < 0; and qhrD > 0. The last property
of the output production function implies that the marginal product of the recyclable
input increases as the use of the harvested input rises. Indeed, utilizing a recycled input
exclusively in a production process tends to become very costly or even impossible as the
production level increases, as is exempli¯ed by some cases of paper and plastic products
where their production and consumption processes signi¯cantly alter the qualities of the
inputs. As a result, it becomes increasingly di±cult to produce a quality product by
more disproportional use of a recycled input.
The pro¯t maximization problem of a representative ¯rm can be written as
Max
h;rD
¦(h; rD) = pq(h; rD)¡ C(h)¡ th¡ prrD; (6)
where the convex function C(h) signi¯es the cost of harvesting and processing the vir-
gin natural resource for the production purpose, t is the per-unit tax on the harvested
resource, and pr is the price per unit of the recyclable input, which is determined within
the recyclable input market.
The ¯rst-order conditions for pro¯t maximization are
pqh(h; rD)¡ Ch(h)¡ t = 0; (7)
pqrD(h; rD)¡ pr = 0: (8)
2.3 Market Equilibrium
Finally, as both the product and input markets need to clear in equilibrium, we have the
following two market equilibrium conditions:
LqD = Nq(h; rD); (9)
7We suppose that the property right of a producer over the natural resource it owns is fully enforceable.
Thus, we do not deal with an open access issue which are quite prevalent in some parts of the developing
world.
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LrS = NrD; (10)
where (9) is for the output market and (10) is for the recyclable input market. The
market equilibrium is described by (4), (5), (7), (8), (9) and (10).
3 Comparative Statics
Totally di®erentiating (4), (5), (7), (8), (9) and (10) with respect to the endogenous
variables and policy variables, we are able to conduct comparative statics analysis of our
model. The main ¯nding can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. An increase in a recycling subsidy for households and an increase in
a disposal fee on household waste respectively have ambiguous impacts on the level of
the natural resource harvested by ¯rms, whereas the increase in the tax on the resource
harvest necessarily discourages the ¯rm's harvesting e®ort.
Proof. See the comparative statics results in Appendix. Q.E.D.
This proposition hints a rather alarming possibility that an attempt to encourage the
recycling activities by way of an increase in a recycling subsidy for consumers as well as
an increase in a garbage disposal fee actually leads to a detrimental consequence in the
light of natural resource conservation.
We can explain the mechanisms behind Proposition 1 as follows. On the one hand,
an increase in the subsidy encourages the households to conduct more recycling activities
and raises the availability of the recyclable input in this input market, which induces
the ¯rms' input substitution toward this recyclable input. On the other hand, due to an
increase in this subsidy, the consumers' demand for the recyclable output rises, which
can raise the ¯rm's input demand for the natural resource. Proposition 1 indicates the
possibility that the interactions of these e®ects in the output and input markets may
result in an increase in the overall resource harvesting activities. It is also intriguing to
note that the sign of the change in the price of the recyclable input with respect to the
increase in a recycling subsidy is ambiguous because of the hike in the ¯rm's production
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level.
The impacts of an increase in the volume-based garbage fee work quite di®erently.
Its increase certainly dampens the household's demand for the output as it implies an
increase in its overall disposal cost. At the same time, it encourages the recycling activities
by the households as this mode of disposal becomes economically more attractive, which
has a favorable impact on the ¯rm's production through an increase in the availability
of the recyclable input. These two considerations produce ambiguous results not just in
the output quantity and recyclable input price levels but also in the ¯rm's demand for
the natural resource input.
Let us look more closely into the comparative statics results in order to obtain the
conditions under which an economic policy measure back¯res in terms of inducing greater
resource harvesting e®orts by the ¯rms. As for the e®ect of providing a recycling subsidy
for households upon the natural resource harvest, we can obtain the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 2. An increase in a recycling subsidy for households is more likely to in-
crease the natural resource harvested by ¯rms when 1) the marginal utility of the recyclable
product, q, diminishes slowly, 2) the marginal product of the recycled input, r, is lower, 3)
the number of households in an economy, L, is su±ciently larger relative to the number
of resource-owning ¯rms, N , and 4) the magnitude of the cross-partial derivative, qhrD ,
is more signi¯cant.
Proof. Through the examination of the comparative statics result of h with respect to ±,
i.e., (A2) in Appendix, we can derive the above conditions that contribute to making its
overall sign turns out to be negative. Q.E.D.
The ¯rst condition concerns the household's preference for the recyclable output. When
the household possesses less risk-averse preference with respect to the recyclable product,
such a situation is more likely to occur. In addition, this is likely to be the case when
the absolute consumption level is relatively small. These situations are probably more
applicable to developing countries rather than developed countries.
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Secondly, lower productivity of the recyclable input tends to increase the ¯rms' re-
liance on the natural resource input in order to cater to the increased consumers' demand
for the product after the increase in the recycling subsidy. This case is more plausible in
an industry where a recycling-related production technology is still in its infancy.
The third condition can be interpreted in the context of the abundance of the con-
cerned natural resource in an economy in relation to its population size. It implies that,
when the population size is relatively larger, given a ¯xed number of resource owning
¯rms, the increase in the recycling subsidy is more likely to contribute to the depletion of
the natural resource stock. This suggests that the government of such a resource scarce
nation needs to be more careful in their choices of economic instruments.
Finally, the last condition states that this back¯re case is likely to occur when the
marginal productivity of the recyclable input can be enhanced greatly by the concurrent
use of the natural resource input. This is presumably the case in paper and plastic
industries where it becomes increasingly more di±cult to produce a high quality product
with the disproportional use of a recycled input.
Furthermore, we can obtain the following proposition concerning the e®ects of impos-
ing a disposal fee on household waste:
Proposition 3. An increase in a garbage disposal fee on households is more likely to
increase the natural resource harvested by ¯rms when 1) the marginal utility of the recy-
clable product, q, diminishes slowly, 2) the marginal product of the recycled input, r, is
lower, 3) the number of households in an economy, L, are large relative to the number of
resource-owning ¯rms, N , 4) the magnitude of the cross-partial derivative, qhrD , is more
signi¯cant, and 5) the marginal disutility of recycling increases slowly.
Proof. By closely examining the comparative statics result of h with respect to ¿ , i.e.,
(A3) in Appendix, we can derive the above favorable conditions that make its overall sign
negative. Q.E.D.
This proposition identi¯es the conditions under which an increase in the volume-based
garbage fee on consumers back¯res in terms of inducing greater resource harvesting e®orts
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by ¯rms. Indeed, the ¯rst four observations coincide with those obtained in Proposition
2 for the recycling subsidy whereas the ways in which these two policies function are not
exactly the same as we have seen above. As for the last condition, one possible explana-
tion can be provided in the context of the opportunity cost of time for households. This
condition is applicable when the opportunity cost of time increases rather slowly, which is
again typical of households in developing nations where good employment opportunities
are rather limited.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this note, we have found that an increase in a recycling subsidy for consumers and an
increase in a disposal fee on household waste can respectively contribute to an increase
in the harvesting e®orts of a natural resource input by ¯rms. Overall, our investigations
indicate that a resource-scarce developing nation is more liable to witness those back¯re
cases. Our ¯nding calls for, at least, more careful implementations of these economic
instruments.
As a direction of future studies, an important extension of our static model is to
incorporate dynamic aspects of recycling activities and natural resource use, especially
taking into account the evolution of a resource stock.8 Also, it would be interesting to
examine how the presence of market power can alter our analytical outcomes.9
References
[1] Fullerton, D. and T. Kinnaman, 1995, Garbage, Recycling, and Illicit Burning or
Dumping, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 29, 71-91.
[2] Gaudet, G. and N. Van Long, 2001, Recycling Redux: Nash-Cournot Approach,
Japanese Economic Review, 54, 409-419.
8For instance, Smith (1972) o®ers a classical investigation into the economic signi¯cance of recycling
activities and renewable natural resource use.
9The relevance of considering market power in a recyclable product market has been identi¯ed by
Martin (1982) for monopoly and by Gaudet and Van Long (2001) for oligopoly, for instance.
9
[3] Kinnaman, T., 2006, Examining the Justi¯cation for Residential Recycling, Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 20, 219-232.
[4] Kinnaman, T. and D. Fullerton, 2000, The Economics of Residential Solid Waste
Management, in H. Folmer and T. Tietenberg (eds), The International Yearbook of
Environmental and Resource Economics 2000/2001, Edward Elger, Cheltenham, UK,
100-146.
[5] Martin, R., 1982, Monopoly Power and the Recycling of Raw Material, Journal of
Industrial Economics, 30, 405-419.
[6] Palmer, K. and M. Walls, 1997, Optimal Policies for Solid Waste Disposal: Taxes,
Subsidies and Standards, Journal of Public Economics, 65, 193-205.
[7] Shinkuma, T., 2003, On the Second-best Policy for Household Waste Recycling, En-
vironmental and Resource Economics, 24, 77-95.
[8] Smith, V. L., 1972, Dynamics of waste disposal: Disposal Versus Recycling, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 86, 600-616.
[9] Walls, M., M. Macauley, and S. Anderson, 2005, Private Markets, Contracts, and
Government Provision: What Explains the Organization of Local Waste and Recy-
cling Markets?, Urban A®airs Review, 40, 590-613.
Appendix: Comparative Statics Results
Based on this system of equations, (4), (5), (7), (8), (9), and (10), we can obtain the
so-called comparative statics equation as follows:26666664
uqDqD uqDrS 0 0 ¡1 0
urSqD urSrS 0 0 0 0
0 0 pqhh ¡ Chh pqhrD qh 0
0 0 pqrDh pqrDrD qrD ¡1
¡L 0 Nqh NqrD 0 0
0 L 0 ¡N 0 0
37777775
26666664
dqD
drS
dh
drD
dp
dpr
37777775 =
26666664
d¿
d± ¡ d¿
dt
0
0
0
37777775 ;
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where the sign of the determinant of the Jacobian matrix, J , can be found eventually as:¯¯
J
¯¯
= (¡L)urSrS(pqhh ¡ Chh)(¡N)¡NqhhurSrS(¡N) > 0: (A1)
Given (A1) and the assumptions on the household's utility and ¯rm's production functions
described in the text, we can obtain the following comparative statics results with respect
to the three di®erent types of economic instruments:
@qD
@±
=
(pqhh ¡ Chh)NqDL¡ pqhrDNqhL¯¯
J
¯¯ < 0;
@rS
@±
=
(¡1)[¡(pqhh ¡ Chh)(¡L)(¡N)]¡ qhuqDqDNqh(¡N)¯¯
J
¯¯ < 0;
@h
@±
=
(¡L)LpqhrD + qh(¡uqDqDLNqrD)¯¯
J
¯¯ R 0; (A2)
@p
@±
=
uqDqD(pqhh ¡ Chh)NqrDL¯¯
J
¯¯ > 0;
@pr
@±
=
LuqDqD [qhhpqrDrDN + qrD(pqhh ¡ Chh)N(1 + qrD)] + L2(pqhh ¡ Chh)pqrDrD¯¯
J
¯¯ R 0;
@qD
@¿
=
¡(pqhh ¡ Chh)NqrDL¡ (¡pqhrDNqhL)¡ qhurSrSNqh(¡N)¯¯
J1
¯¯ R 0;
@rS
@¿
=
¡(pqhh ¡ Chh)(¡N)(¡L) + qhuqDqDNqh(¡N)¯¯
J1
¯¯ > 0;
@h
@¿
=
¡(¡L)LpqhrD ¡ qh[¡urSrS(¡L)(¡N)]¡ qh(¡uqDqDLNqrD)¯¯
J
¯¯ R 0; (A3)
@p
@¿
=
(¡L)NuqDqD [(pqhh ¡ Chh) + (pqhh ¡ Chh)qrD ¡ pqhrDqh]¯¯
J
¯¯ < 0;
@pr
@¿
=
¡LurSrS [pqrDh(¡N)qh ¡ qrD(pqhh ¡ Chh)] + L2[¡(pqhh ¡ Chh)pqrDrD + pqhrDpqhrD ]¯¯
J
¯¯
+
LuqDqD [pqhrDqrDNqh + pqhrDNqrDqh ¡ qhpqrDrDNqh ¡ (pqhh ¡ Chh)NqrDqrD ]¯¯
J
¯¯ R 0;
@qD
@t
=
¡urSrSNqh(¡N)¯¯
J
¯¯ < 0;
@rS
@t
=
0¯¯
J
¯¯ = 0;
@h
@t
=
(¡1)[¡urSrS(¡L)(¡N)]¯¯
J
¯¯ < 0:
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